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Commentary
In the Park: A Jurisprudential Primer
ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON*
WHAT ISA "PARK"? This seemingly simple query begs a simple and straightforward answer. Yet efforts to address it introduce a whole range of difficult issues
and challenges. When asked in a judicial context in particular, it raises a further
raft of perplexing issues about the nature of language, law, and adjudication. In
determining what is to count as a park, lawyers and judges are obliged to confront,
if only to ignore or finesse, some of the most recalcitrant problems on the jurisprudential agenda: what is the relation between law and political morality? What
is the role of the judge in a constitutional democracy? And what is involved in
"fidelity to law"?
In this commentary, I rely on two recent Canadian appellate decisions to
demonstrate how even the most prosaic business of judging draws upon and
speaks to basic jurisprudential queries. Rather than offer any definitive set of
answers to specific cases, a working knowledge of jurisprudential debate can at
least illuminate some of the shadowy corners of adjudicative practice and interrogate what is often taken for granted. Moreover, by grappling more seriously
with the day-to-day workings of the judicial process, jurisprudential analysis can
invigorate itself and cast off its rather aloof and abstract posture. To focus the
debate, I will set the two Canadian cases within the famous Hart-Fuller exchange
of over fifty years ago, which, for better and for worse, still tends to frame contemporary debate.' After exploring the positivist and naturalist approaches to
adjudicative responsibilities, I will sketch a more critical approach. The ambition
*

Distinguished Research Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. I am grateful to Trevor
Farrow, Cynthia Hill, and Ian Langois for their critical comments and helpful suggestions.

1.

H.L.A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev.
593 [Hart, "Separation of Law and Morals"]; Lon L. Fuller, "Positivism and Fidelity to Law
- A Reply to Professor Hart" (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630.

338 12010) 48 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

throughout is to offer, by way of a primer, a rudimentary bridge between the
worlds of legal practice and legal theory.

I. LOOKING FOR A PARK
Under section 161(1)(a) of the Criminal Code,2 a convicted pedophile can be
prohibited from attending a variety of places where persons under the age of
fourteen are or might be present. These places include a public park or public
swimming area, a daycare centre, a school ground, a playground, or a community
centre. The main purpose is obviously to protect young children and to put them
out of a pedophile's way. However, this prohibition must be balanced against a
person's freedom of movement because even pedophiles are entitled to lead a
certain public life as long as they do not commit further crimes. In resolving this
tension, it is important to be as clear as possible in determining to what places
the prohibition does and does not apply. In a number of cases, the courts have
been required to decide the meaning of "public park" under section 161.
In R. v. Lachapelle, an accused pedophile was subject to a prohibition order
when he was apprehended at a carnival by two RCMP officers who were aware
of the order. He had attended the carnival with a ninety-two-year-old woman,
Margaret Brown, who employed him as her daily help. They were there to have
a hamburger and fries for dinner. The travelling carnival was set up on a vacant
piece of private land in a large field.. The carnival was busy and there were, as
expected, many young children in attendance. At trial, Justice Milne held that
the field in which the carnival was located was not a "public park" and acquitted
the accused. On the Crown's appeal, the British Columbia Supreme Court
agreed and upheld the acquittal. In reaching his decision, Justice Butler preferred
a limited view of what constituted a "public park." He decided that it did not
include land that was being used for recreational use, whether permanently or
temporarily, and to which the public had access. Instead, he emphasised that, for
property to constitute a "public park" for the purposes of section 161 prohibition
orders, it had to be set aside by some authority for use by the public. This meant
2.

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, s. 161(1)(a).

3.

[2008] B.C.J. No. 728 (S.C.) (QL) [Lachapelle].
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more than simply being accessible to the public. Emphasizing the need for clarity
and predictability, Justice Butler concluded,
Prohibition orders issued under s. 161 are a significant limitation on the fundamental
liberty of movement of convicted pedophiles. If the words of the section are given
their ordinary meaning, the geographical ambit of the prohibition is clear and the
offender will know with a high degree of certainty what locations must be avoided.
The trial judge gave the words "public park" ... their ordinary meaning and read
them appropriately in context. It was not the intention of Parliament to prevent a
pedophile from attending at all events involving some element of recreation or play
where children may be present. It is the specific location that determines whether
or not the offence has been committed, not the nature of the activity occurring at
the time. The fact that a travelling carnival with amusement rides is being held on
4
a vacant, private field does not turn that field into a "public park."

In the recent case of R. v. Perron,sanother pedophile who was subject to a
similar section 161 prohibition was arrested while working in a game booth at
the Super Ex, a fair being held on the grounds of Lansdowne Park in Ottawa.
The fair comprised the usual mid-way rides, game booths, concert areas, food
courts, and a petting zoo. It was accessible to the public for a fee and attracted
many young children. Lansdowne Park contains a football stadium, a civic centre
with a hockey arena, and several other buildings. While there are trees and grassy
areas around the fenced perimeter of the property, there is also an extensive paved
area that serves as a parking lot for events. The fair was held on the paved area.
At trial, Justice Maisonneuve held that the fair was a "public park" and convicted
the accused.
On appeal, the issue was framed in terms of whether a "public park" was exclusively a green space (e.g., lawns, trees, et cetera) set aside for recreational use
by the public or was primarily to be defined by its use alone rather than by any
of its landscaping features. In his judgment on behalf of the Court of Appeal
for Ontario, Justice Goudge was again mindful of the need for care and clarity in
circumscribing the accused person's freedom of movement. Nevertheless, he
needed little persuading that the major identifying characteristic of a "public

4.

Ibid. at para. 31.

5.

(2010), 97 O.R. (3d) 538 [Perron].
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park" was its recreational purpose, not the particular attributes of its physical
geography. Accordingly, noting that the primary use of Lansdowne Park was recreational and that there was at least some greenery, albeit "peripheral," the fair
was considered to be a "public park" and the conviction was upheld. He concluded by noting,
The appellant places significant reliance on Lachapelle, where the British Columbia
Supreme Court determined that a prohibition order ... did not extend to a vacant
private field where a travelling carnival with amusement rides was being held. As I
read the decision, the determining factor seems to be that the location was a vacant
private field. If so, I agree with the result. If, however, the decision stands for the
proposition that the nature of the activities taking place at the location is irrelevant,
6
then respectfully, I disagree with it.

In each of these cases, the judges said little about the interpretive method
that they had relied upon to reach their decisions. There were small hints and
casual asides, but there was nothing substantial or anything that suggested that
they found their task to be particularly difficult or challenging. For the most part,
they seemed to proceed on the understandable basis that this was a rather runof-the-mill exercise in adjudicative decision making that implied or raised no
pressing jurisprudential concerns. Yet there is much to be found in and between
the lines of these judgments that merits a keener jurisprudential scrutiny and
reflection. While this would likely not change the judges' decisions, it might give
them, lawyers, and observers of the judicial process a more nuanced appreciation
of how the most apparently prosaic of issues touches upon and resonates with
more profound questions of law, language, and interpretation.

II. A PLAIN AND HARTY APPROACH
The celebrated debate that took place between Herbert Hart and Lon Fuller at
Harvard Law School on the occasion of Hart's Holmes Lectures was about much
6.

Ibid. at para. 21.

7.

I have wrestled with these problems at length in my own work. See Allan C. Hutchinson, It's
All in the Game: A Non-FoundationalistAccount ofLaw andAdjudication (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2000); Evolution and the Common Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005); and The Province offurisprudence Democratized(New York: Oxford University
Press, 2009) [Hutchinson,JurirprudenceDemocratized]. I draw on some of those ideas here.
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more than judicial interpretation.' Still operating in the institutional shadow
and moral stench of the Nazi era, the two antagonists were engaged about the
general relation between law and morality. In particular,. they joined issue over
whether a legal rule or body of rules might lose its designation and force as "law"
because its origins, format, or substance made it so morally offensive as to cease
to be law. However, in locking jurisprudential horns over that serious issue, they
ventured into territory that brought into question the basis and dynamics of
judicial interpretation. In particular, they traced out the basic implications of
their respective positivist and naturalist stances for less fraught matters of adjudication method and role. This involved a spirited exchange over how to go about
determining the meaning of the rather mundane rule that there are to be "no
vehicles in the park." From such humble beginnings, there has developed a
whole library of jurisprudential literature around "vehicles," "parks," and other
related definitional conundrums.! The efforts in Lachapelle and Perron provide
more grist for this particular mill.
The basis of Hart's revitalized defence of legal positivism is that it is important
to keep the analysis of the law as-it-is separate from the law as-it-ought-to-be. It is
important that inquiries into the moral merit of a legal rule be distinguished from
its status as a legal rule. To ground his thesis, Hart understood that it was necessary
to demonstrate that there is a certain "thereness" to law so that its existence is not
always reducible to opinion or discretion. It followed from this that adjudicative
application of law must in significant part be a matter of descriptive accuracy as

8.

9.

For a fascinating and more personalized contextual account of this debate, see Nicola Lacey,
A Life ofH.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2004).
There is a whole list of discussions about "vehicles in the park." Among the more
illuminating are Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A PhilosophicalExamination ofRuleBased Decision-Makingin Law and in Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); Steven L.
Winter, A Clearingin the Forest: Law, Life andMind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2001); Anthony D'Amato, "Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?"
(1999) 75 Va. L. Rev. 561; William N. Eskridge, Jr., "The Circumstances of Politics and the
Application of Statutes" (2000) 100 Colum. L. Rev. 558; Robert E. Keeton, "Statutory
Analogy, Purpose, and Policy in Legal Reasoning: Live Lobsters and a Tiger Cub in the
Park" (1993) 52 Md. L. Rev. 1192; Andrei Marmor,"No Easy Cases?" (1990) 3 Can. J.L. &
Jur. 61 at 65-68; Pierre Schlag, "No Vehicles in the Park" (1999) 3 Seattle U.L. Rev. 381;
Frederick Schauer, "A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park" (2008) 83 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
1109; and Peter M. Tiersma, "A Message in a Bottle: Text, Autonomy, and Statutory
Interpretation" (2001) 76 Tulane L. Rev. 431.
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much as prescriptive evaluation. Without a critical mass of settled rules, the
very idea that rules control judicial decisions, that there exists an actual body
of workable rules, that such rules command authoritative conformity, that
judging is something less than legislative policy making, and that there is
some meaningful distinction between the law as-it-is and the law as-it-oughtto-be, would be lost.
Of course, Hart had no truck with a mechanical or formalist jurisprudence
in which law could be identified and applied in a formulaic or algorithmic way
in all cases. Instead, he relied upon an important distinction between the core
and penumbra of a rule. The core is those standard or settled instances "in which
no doubts are felt about its application." In the penumbral area of a rule, its
application will be sufficiently contestable such that it will demand a certain
exercise of evaluative judgment because the situation will "have some features in
common with the standard case [but] will lack others or be accompanied by features not present in the standard case."'o Whereas the law will be certain and
given in the core instances, it will be up-for-grabs and to be settled in the penumbral edges: "the hard core of settled meaning is law in some centrally important
sense and ... even if there are borderlines, there must first be lines. If this were
not so the notion of rules controlling courts' decisions would be senseless.""
Accordingly, by maintaining a general distinction between the core and penumbra, Hart claimed to be able to preserve the vital positivist quality of law as something that can be identified as a matter of fact rather than by resort to moral
evaluation. If he was unable to do that, his central claim about law's existence as a
social fact would be severely compromised.

10.

Hart, "Separation of Law and Morals," supra note 1 at 607.

11.

Ibid.at 614. Hart was not entirely consistent about the empirical distribution of these so
called easy and hard cases. By 1983, he insisted that the standard resort to rule application
occurred "very often" and was the primary device for legitimate adjudication. Although
originally written in 1967, these latter words and ideas were republished unchanged in 1983.
See ibid. at 629; H.L.A. Hart, "Problems of The Philosophy of Law" in H.L.A. Hart, ed.,
Essays injurisprudenceandPhilosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) at 108 [Hart, "The
Philosophy of Law"). In 1961 (unchanged in the 1994 edition), Hart noted that rule
application will work "smoothly ... over the great mass of ordinary cases." See H.L.A. Hart,
The Concept ofLaw (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) at 164; H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of
Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) at 127-28.
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If the judicial task in easy cases (i.e., where the facts fall within the rule's core
meaning) is straightforward, Hart did not mean to portray the resolution of hard
cases (i.e., where the facts fall outside the rule's core meaning) as being entirely
open-ended and discretionary. While he recognized that "the criterion which
makes a decision sound in such cases is some concept of what the law ought to
be"" and that "in the penumbral situation judges must necessarily legislate,""
judges should be concerned with "adapting their decisions to the growing needs
of society"" by looking to the law's own "aims, purposes and policies."" He
cavilled at treating the extension of old rules to new cases as judicial legislation,
because doing so failed to appreciate the obvious difference between a deliberate
act of law making and the incremental development of a rule so as to advance
the rule's "continuing and identical purpose, hitherto less specifically apprehended."" For Hart, the loss of complete certainty and predictability is the price
that has to be paid for the law being flexible enough to handle unanticipated cases
in a fair and just manner. The challenge for both the judge and the jurist is to
strike an appropriate and manageable balance between the rule-application of
clear cases and the rule-production of hard cases, such that systemic certainty is
not sacrificed entirely to particularized flexibility. On this issue, Hart was adamant
that if clear cases do not comprise the bulk of adjudicated decisions, "we should
not attach significance and value to them or think of such decisions as reached
through a rational process."" For Hart, therefore, the existence of such clear cases
was crucial to the basic validity of his entire jurisprudence.
For instance, in grappling with the interpretive challenges of "no vehicles
in the park," Hart ran through several permutations of possible facts and likely
judicial outcomes. He stated that "plainly this [rule] forbids an automobile, but
what about bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles?" Much of his time was devoted
to explaining how we might apply the rule to "bicycles, roller skates, [and] toy
automobiles" which are "uncontrolled by linguistic conventions."" Yet Hart did

12.

Hart, "Separation of Law and Morals," ibid. at 608.

13. Ibid. at 609.
14.

Ibid.

15.

Ibid. at 614.

16.

Ibid. at 627.

17.

Hart, "The Philosophy of Law," supra note 11 at 108.

18.

Hart, "Separation of Law and Morals," supra note I at 607, 611.
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little to defend his blunt conclusion that the rule "plainly ... forbids" "automobile[s]." He simply asserted that automobiles are vehicles as a matter of fact; they
are part of the core's meaning and comprise one of the rule's settled meanings.
At bottom, his claim seemed to be that "vehicle" simply does include automobiles
and to deny that would be absurd or perverse. But what is this plain meaning?
Where and how does it come by its plainness? And why does this plain meaning exert such authority over us?
Hart was not clear about the epistemological and ontological nature of his
claims about "automobiles" plainly being "vehicles" or the philosophical status
of what is meant by something being a matter of fact. Nevertheless, whatever his
general stance on such issues, he was in something of a hermeneutical bind. If
he claimed that the use of "vehicle" is always and plainly inclusive of "automobiles," he would have run into the brute historical reality that "vehicle" was a
word long before automobiles were in existence; it presumably had some different
core and settled meaning. As such, it is simply nonsensical to claim that a word
has a plain and core meaning outside of its historical context. However, if Hart
conceded the relevance of history, he would have been confronted by the equally
brute reality that words receive and change their meaning in light of the particular
social conventions and linguistic customs in place; meanings are not fixed, but
shift and change with their informing social context. The meaning of "vehicle"
has little to do with the word itself, but with the tentatively accepted and continually shifting routines and practices of meaning-giving. In short, there is no context of contexts to authoritatively fix a word's plain meaning at any particular
point in time or place. There will always be simply more or less agreement about
the proper context of any word and, therefore, its present plain meaning. Accordingly, the plainness of any meaning is the result of prior agreement, and not the
foundation for debate about the extent of that agreement.
In the Canadian challenge of determining the meaning and application of
"public park" for the purposes of a section 161 prohibition order, a Hart-inspired
judge would presumably first isolate the settled or plain meaning of "public park"
and then ascertain whether the facts of either Lachape/le or Perron did or did not
fall within it. If they did, the case would be disposed of without more; if not, the
judge would engage in a more creative exercise of reasoning that canvassed the
possible purposes, aims, and policies of the statutory rule and then reach a decision that best reflected a balancing of those indicators. This is what the judges
in Lachapelle and Perron claimed to do.
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In Lachapelle, Justice Butler saw the judge's task as being that of giving the
words "public park" "their ordinary meaning" and reading them "appropriately
in context."" In line with this approach, he decided that a "public park" was
"an area that is set aside or designated as a park by some authority."20 Moreover,
he went on to add that applying this "ordinary usage"21 would "normally be
uncontroversial."22 Similarly, in Perron, Justice Goudge accepted that his role
was to ascertain the "grammatical and ordinary sense" of the words "public park"
(as well as harmonizing the sense "with the scheme of the Act, the object of the
Act, and the intention of Parliament")22 and apply it to the facts at hand. Nevertheless, although Justices Butler and Goudge found it easy to state their allotted
task of building on and being constrained by the words' plain meaning, they
found it much more difficult to follow through with the task in any uncontroversial or simple way: how do you locate the ordinary meaning? What if the.plain
meaning is itself contested? And what is plain and ordinary about a word's
plain and ordinary meaning?
Of course, the problem with this plain and Hart-sanctioned approach is that
it seems to beg the whole question that it is intended to answer-it demands some
way in which to identify a core instance from a penumbral problem that itself does
not confound or implicate the fact/value distinction that the core/penumbra
distinction is intended to finesse or obviate. Indeed, in Perron, and to a lesser
extent in Lachapelle, the exchange between the court and the accused's counsel was
explicitly centred on determining the ordinary meaning of "public park" "in its
regular everyday use."2" However, even though Justices Butler and Goudge were
very similarly situated, they chose to employ a different criterion as to what characterised a "park." Whereas Justice Butler thought the plain meaning pivoted
around its official designation, Justice Goudge preferred a definition that emphasised its usage. Such a sharp difference does not auger well for the identification of its "plain meaning." As this discussion shows, if Hart's core/penumbra
19.

Lachapelle, supra note 3 at para. 31.

20. Ibid. at para. 28.
21.

Ibid.

22.

Ibid. at para. 26.

23.

Perron,supra note 5 at para. 12, citing Elmer Driedger, Construction ofStatutes, 2d ed.
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 87.

24.

Ibid. at para. 9.
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distinction does not have a certain built-in operational efficacy, it will be of little use. The judge will have no place from which to enter or break the circle of interpretive or evaluative choice; he or she will be engaged in a transparently bootstrapping argument. This challenge is exactly what Fuller draws attention to
and emphasizes in his rejoinder to Hart; there is no plain and ordinary meaning
that is plainly and ordinarily there and available for judicial use without some
contestable act of discretionary choice.

III. A FULLER RESPONSE
Fuller's main contribution to the positivism-naturalism debate lies in his insistence that it is neither possible nor desirable to keep the domains of law and
morality separate. For him, any legal theory worth its intellectual and political
salt must commit itself to ensuring that law and morality do not part compan'y;
the Nazi experience should be warning enough about the dangers of allowing
such a schism. Yet most commentators have tended to dismiss Fuller's position
and declare Hart to be the winner in their seminal debate. Whatever the moral
basis of Fuller's claim, it is seen to be simply unconvincing and untenable as an
analytical account of law's status as law-bad law is no less law for its badness
in form or substance. Whereas Hart's ideas are considered to remain continually
relevant, Fuller's approach is considered quaint and only of historical interest.25
Regardless of the fairness or finality of the contemporary disregard about
Fuller's questions of law and morality, his critical response to Hart's claims about
the interpretive "thereness" of law warrants and repays considerable attention.
Fuller rejected Hart's claim that "in applying the word to its 'standard instance,'
no creative role is assumed by the judge ... [and] he is simply applying the law
'as it is."' 26 To put it bluntly, Fuller believed that this is so much errant nonsense.
For him, it is not that the rule or its constituent words-"vehicles," "in," and
"park" -have a fixed meaning, but that our current agreement about what they
mean is sufficiently broad and accepted in a particular context that no one is
presently prepared to argue that the rule or words might carry a different meaning.

25. There has been a recent revival of interest in Fuller's ideas with the fiftieth anniversary of the
Harvard debate. See e.g. the varied contributions to Paul Cane, ed., The Hart-FullerDebate
in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010). Whether this revival will
blossom into something more lasting is still unclear.
26.

Fuller, supra note 1 at 662.
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In saying this, Fuller was not denying that words have meaning. Rather, he was
contending that words do not underwrite agreed meanings, but that our agreements fix and unfix the meaning attributed to words. As contexts shift and
change across time, geography, and evaluative commitments, so the meaning
given to words will itself shift and change. As Fuller put it,
If in some cases we seem to be able to apply the rule without asking what its
purpose is, this is not because we can treat a directive arrangement as if it had no
purpose. It is rather because, for example, whether the rule be intended to preserve
quiet in the park, or to save carefree strollers from injury, we know, "without thinking," that a noisy automobile must be excluded.

It is this "without thinking" that hides, rather than avoids, the deeper value
commitments and choices in play.
The short judgments in Lachapelle and Perron show that, despite their declared reliance on the supposedly plain and ordinary meaning of "public park,"
the judges had no way to establish that meaning in an exclusively factual as
opposed to evaluative way; it was a mix-and-match process. For example, in
Perron,Justice Goudge consulted the Canadian Oxford Dictionary,which offers
eight definitions of "park." He concluded summarily that "six are of relevance[,]
... all are specified locations characterized by what goes on there[,] ... [and], for
most of the six, it is some form of recreational activity."" It is unclear how
Justice Goudge's conclusion explains the inclusion of "industrial park" in his
privileged list of six. However, in Lachapelle, Justice Butler seems to have arrived
at a different conclusion about the plain meaning of "public park"; he emphasized designation over usage. In light of what Justice Goudge said in Perron, it
is a stretch to conclude that "any member of the public"29 would know that all
"areas set aside for indolence and rest of the body and soul"-Stanley Park, including the aquarium and the zoo area[,] ... the endowment lands at the University of British Columbia[,] ... the Sky Train greenbelt[,] ... the marine parks in

the province, waterfront parks[,] ... and all beaches, lakes and rivers in Canada capable of being used by people for bathing"30 -were included in the definition of

27. Ibid. at 662-63.
28.

Perron, supra note 5 at para 15.

29.

Lachapelle, supra note 3 at para. 28.

30.

Ibid. at para. 27, Butler J. citing Maughan P.C.J. in R v. Graf(1988), 42 C.R.R. 146 at
para. 150 (B.C. Prov. Ct.).
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"public park." In short, the judgments confirm that there is no straightforward or
incontestable way to distinguish a Hartian core and penumbra. As Fuller noted,
the evaluative work is being done off-stage and "without thinking,"3 1 but it is
still being done.
In taking such a stance, Fuller was not subscribing to an anything-goes
approach to the execution of judicial responsibility. in applying rules. As Hart
did in recommending how judges should cope with their role in penumbral
areas, Fuller acknowledged that judges are not free everywhere and always to
interpret rules as they wish. He called attention to the law's "structural integrity"32 or "fabric of thought,"33 which judges must strive to detect and follow
in their interpretive exertions. It is the task and responsibility of the judiciary to
identify and work with the law's overall purposive enterprise "so that we may
know truly what it is, but it is also something that we inevitably help to create
as we strive (in accordance with our obligation of fidelity to law) to make the [law]
a coherent, workable whole."3 " As such, the judge's duty to observe and respect
a "fidelity to law not only permits but demands a creative role from the judge,
but beyond that structure it does not permit him to go."" Accordingly, the crucial
difference between Hart and Fuller is that, whereas Hart treats such creative
reasoning as exceptional and occasional, Fuller maintains that it goes to the very
heart of the regular judicial task. And, of course, too much penumbra and too
little core, let alone no core at all, would be fatal for Hart's positivist insistence on
the analytical separation of law and morality.
While Fuller is surely right to reject Hart's simplistic reliance on core meanings, his own confidence in purposive meaning seems misplaced. As both a
philosophical and practical matter, there is little to suggest that it is possible
to identify a particular legislative intent that is capable of grounding and authorizing statutory interpretation over time. As a practical matter, even if courts were
correct in their assumption that an application of legislative intent would best

31.

Fuller, supra note 1 at 663.

32.

Ibid.at 670.

33.

Ibid.at 667.

34.

Ibid.

35.

Ibid.at 670. It will be obvious to many that these claims about law's integrity have been
worked up into a full-blown account of adjudication by Ronald Dworkin. See especially
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (London: Fontana Press, 1986). [Dworkin, Law's Empire];
Ronald Dworkin,Justice in Robes (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006).
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fulfill their democratic mandate, it is difficult to know how it would be possible to
locate such intent. The initial step of distinguishing intention from aspiration,
expectation, and the like, is probably insurmountable: there is no reason to assume
that everything that legislators say is what they mean or intend. Further, the
attempt to generate a finding of what a large group of legislators would have
wanted over time, after circumstances have changed and in unanticipated disputes, seems destined to be frustrated; the identification of past intentions,
particularly of collective entities, remains doggedly resistant to present or determinate interpretation. Legislators very rarely have a specific or exact intention in
mind across a range of potential future disputes, so this prompts the most speculative of "what if" investigations: if legislators had thought about or anticipated a
problem, which they did not, how would they most likely have answered it?
Moreover, if it is not naive to believe that legislatures are filled with reasonable
politicians who are engaged in.pursuing reasonable goals reasonably and in saying
what they mean, it is most definitely wishful to think that they agree on what
"reasonable" means." As both Justices Butler and Goudge's judgments in Lachapelle and Perron clearly show, the fixing of general intent might be easy (i.e., to
protect children from pedophiles), but its application to specific situations is far
from straightforward. Consequently, the idea that intent can act as a curb on
judicial interpretive freedom is unconvincing; it simply replaces one problematic
context with another.
For both Hart and Fuller, there is an insufficient acknowledgment of the
corrosive effect of time and place on the effort to fix words with plain meaning.
The shifting contexts of meaning-creation and meaning-application (and, of
course, their bewildering combination across time) defy any uncontroversial
judicial method of deciding cases that relieves judges of the considerable burden
of choice. While the definition of "public park" for section 161 purposes may
not be.particularly weighty, it takes little imagination to see how the stakes can
be quickly and sizeably raised on more pressing and wide-ranging occasions. As
Fuller himself noted, "the matter assumes a very different aspect, however, if our
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interest lies in the ideal of fidelity to law, for then it may become a matter of
capital importance what position is assigned to the judiciary in the general frame
of government."" Fuller called Hart's semantic bluff, but only managed to let
the political cat out of the judicial bag. As I will now explain, there is no way of
getting that particular animal back in, once it is out.

IV. A PRAGMATIC INTERVENTION
The central problem for those who choose a Hartian or Fullerian approach is
that the value-infused interpretation of law bleeds into the factual identification
of law to such an extent that it renders the distinction unworkable; there is no
available method or means to identify law as a pre-interpretive matter. The
main thrust of the pragmatic stance is a distrust of all claims to have hit upon
some supra-contextual truth, some standard of abiding objectivity, or some
method by which to filter out reference to contested social and political values.
A pragmatic approach insists that there are no bright-line boundaries or essential differences between theory and practice, natural and social science, facts and
values, philosophy and conversation, or, of course, law and politics." It is not
that these categorical distinctions collapse in on each other and have no relevant
differences at all, but that such differences are themselves contingent and social
because they always arise from and within, directly or indirectly, their historical
and political context. From a pragmatic standpoint, legal theory, like law itself,
is treated as thoroughly political in scope and substance.
It is not so much that law does not exist (it does as a body of resources) nor
that its likely development is entirely unpredictable (it is not a result of the general political leanings of the judiciary). Legal history and practice strongly suggest that it is interpretation all the way down; law is a thoroughly human
activity that envelops and infiltrates the legal resources to be interpreted. This
constant toing-and-froing between fact and value is so integral to law as to be
37.
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constitutive of it; it is law. Law is not something that exists before or after interpretive work, but is constituted by that interpretive activity. While this is
most evident in matters of common law adjudication, it is also apparent in all
modes of adjudication.3 " A marked feature of common law adjudication, whether
by way of constitutional or statutory interpretation even, is not so much that a
rule is fixed beforehand and then applied to the facts of the case, but that a rule
is fixed in light of the outcome that it will bring about in the particular case.
There is a constant mediation between rule-fixing and rule-application in the
judicial decision-making process such that it becomes illusory to talk about there
being two distinct stages as a practical matter. The fact that the final judgment
rendered in the case might not reveal this process or that it might work to actively conceal this dynamic process hardly counts against this explanation.
All this by way of stating that the law is always in the process of becoming
rather than in a state of being-the law never simply is. The very act of interpreting law changes it and, on important occasions, redraws it substantially.
The meaning of "park" is protean. Like with most words, its plain meaning
shifts over time and context-what was once the core meaning of a park (e.g.,
the grounds of a stately home) can become a more penumbral feature, and what
was once not thought of as a park (e.g., an industrial park or ballpark) can become part of its core meaning. Similarly, although it does not seem a stretch to
designate private land as a "public park" for temporary purposes (e.g., the holding of a carnival likely required a public license), it also seems sensible to treat
certain public areas as not being a "public park" on occasion (e.g., the holding
of a private, by invitation-only event in a part of Lansdowne Park). There is no
absolute or even contingent right and wrong, but only continuing and inescapable choice that can be masked, but not wished away. Judicial interpretation as
well as its jurisprudential underpinnings are built on shifting sands, not bedrock. Lachapelle and Perron offer evidence of that.
Nevertheless, it is a mistake to draw a distinction between those who believe
that interpretation is about objective retrieval and those who believe that there
is only subjective creation; it is neither one nor the other. Law is not simply
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created in the interaction between the legal materials and the judge, but is
found in the interplay itself; it is the process of interpretation as much as the
resources and the product that counts as law. Indeed, law cannot be broken
down into its constituent parts without losing its essential dynamism. As such,
law is less a thing and more an activity. And, as Fuller would have celebrated
and Hart might have conceded, if that is the case, then law is a human activity
and inextricably bound up with the contested values and divergent commitments of society.
Law is much more than a collection of rules that individually and inevitably
possess a degree of fuzziness and penumbral uncertainty. Taken as a whole, legal
doctrine is strutturally indeterminate and defies efforts to fix its necessary and
precise meaning in particular cases at particular times. Adjudication is better
understood as an interpretive activity in which the possibilities of determinacy
and indeterminacy are constantly in play and available. It is not that fields of law
appear as indeterminate or determinate all the time, but that even the most apparently settled areas of law are always vulnerable to being stabilized or destabilized
and thereby reconfigured with sufficient effort by particular jurists at particular
times and with varying degrees of success. The law is not simply there in its
object-like presence, but is always waiting to be apprehended and fixed by the
active crafting of its judicial interpreters and legal artisans. Most importantly,
determinacy and indeterminacy are not pre-interpretive features of the law, but
products of legal interpretation." Law's meaning is always parenthetical and can
never be grounded outside the contingent work of legal interpretation. As such,
it is not only unhelpful, but also impossible to talk of law's meaning, whether
determinate or indeterminate, as objective or given in the sense of being something that is realizable without legal interpretation. For all their good faith, Justices
Butler and Goudge in Lachapelle and Perron cannot perform their duties in any
convincingly objective or tried-and-true way.
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It should by now be clear that a pragmatic account of law has no need for the
traditional distinction between easy and hard cases. In short, there are no hard
cases or easy cases: there are only cases. "Easiness" is not a quality that inheres
within a case or rule. Since rules and their application do not arise or make sense
outside of an interpretive context, the easiness or hardness of a case derives from
background facts about agreements in judgments, historical contexts, and social
stability. What goes on in easy cases is the same as in hard cases, only that its
context is less contested and more taken for granted. In this sense, Hart was
correct when he stated that easy cases occur where "there is general agreement
that they fall within the scope of a rule,"" provided that the emphasis is firmly
on the fact of "general agreement" and not (as Hart seemed to have intended)
on "the scope of the rule." The fact of this "general agreement" (whether a matter
of social consensus or social hierarchy) is important-the greater its extent and
strength, the greater the existential experience of easy cases and legal certainty."2
When it comes to language, there is simply no fact of the matter; what any term
or rule refers to or means is always an interpretive, and therefore contestable,
issue. Indeed, in understanding language and law as functional instruments, it
is important to see them less as individual tools, like ratchets and screwdrivers,
and more as social devices, like a manufacturing process or community initiative,
that demand a high degree of collaboration and integration. It is in this sense
that "general agreement" is to be understood.
Nevertheless, no matter how extensive or deep the agreement, it does not
alter the fact that easiness never becomes an intrinsic feature of the rule itself.
The temptation to mistake dominant ways of thinking for natural necessity must
be studiously resisted; the process is so ingrained and uncontroversial as to
appear as if the process did not occur. Easy cases are not an occasion to forego
the need for interpretation, but only an occasion upon which there is considered
to be no political reason or political will to disturb prevailing understandings. It is
as much a choice to confirm existing or old "plain" meanings as to deviate from
them; each demands and implicates an exercise of choice. Moreover, in the area
of the common law simpliciter, once it is conceded, as it must be, that superior
41.
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courts can legitimately deviate from or change rules, then it seems pointless to
insist that following existing rules is an entirely non-evaluative process. Consequently, the difference between the resolution of easy and hard cases is not one
of intrinsic identity or separate processes, but one of relative obviousness based
on situated assessments of relevant social contexts and agreements. Whether a
case is hard or easy has little to do with the particular rule itself; all rules are
potentially easy and hard. What determines the perception or treatment of a
case as hard or easy is to be found in a complex appreciation of the contextual
and interrelated positioning of the rule(s) to be applied, the facts to be ascertained, and the parties and judges involved. The limits on judges are not imposed
by the external force of the legal rules, but by the internal pressure of the judges'
own imaginative strengths and political convictions; judges are situated within
a context of constraints that shape as much as limit their freedom.
None of this commits me to the untenable or nihilistic position that it will
always be possible to make the application of a rule come out in the way that
the judge wants it to. Sometimes, cars are vehicles and horses are not, and
sometimes, gardens are parks and marine parks are not. But this is a matter of
imaginative insight or strategic calculation, not objective truth or ahistorical
determinacy; "anything might go," but not "anything goes." In such circumstances, it does not mean that the pragmatic account has failed to give a cogent
or realistic account of law and judging. On the contrary, the very fact that a
critical pragmatism accepts the existential experience of rule-boundedness is what
makes it cogent and realistic. But, in doing so, it does not buy into the unconvincing positivist position (drawing on Hart) that rules have a fixed core meaning
or that the law's purposes (drawing on Fuller) are sufficiently compatible as to
mandate one "right answer" over another. There is much more (and also much
less) to jurisprudential enlightenment than that offered by Hart and Fuller; the
spectrum of interpretive possibilities is much broader and richer.
Consequently, while Hart is right to point out the experience that lawyers
and judges have of the core of settled meaning, he is mistaken to treat that core
as a feature that rules have and to consider that core or meaning to be settled in
anything but the most temporary, provisional, or contingent way. The "core of
settled meaning" is only central, settled, and meaningful until the next case comes
along. Similarly, while Fuller is right to insist upon the ineradicable role of purposive reasoning and evaluative opportunity in applying rules, he is also mistaken
to pretend that such judicial work can be done in the kind of constrained and
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non-ideological way that he and many others claim. As a critical pragmatism
recommends, there is neither constraint nor freedom, but only a dynamic interaction. Judges must constantly work with and within the available materials such
that their constraints are always in place, but never themselves outside of creative
re-interpretation. So understood, adjudication is a thoroughly professional as
well as thoroughly political undertaking.
So what is a "park"? The answer will depend on who asks, why they ask,
and where and when the question is asked. Even if such matters are sufficiently
clarified, there will still be scope for manoeuvre and choice. Jurisprudence will
not provide clear and simple answers to hermeneutical conundrums because there
are no such answers. Justices Milne, Butler, Maisonneuve, and Goudge will not
be relieved of their judicial discretion by deference to jurisprudential insight.
Whatever some jurists suggest and some judges feign, there is no available formula or method that will relieve interpreters of the considerable task of creating,
not finding, meaning in particular words or phrases. The message of jurisprudential critique is that judges cannot shirk responsibility by deferring to the
stark thereness of any word's meaning. Ironically, this challenge is at its most
demanding when there appears to be a settled core of meaning. In such circumstances, judges and jurists must not fool themselves into thinking that their task
is one of merely acting as a conduit for detached or objective truths. All legal
interpretation depends on the fluid and dynamic interaction between interpreter
and text in a shifting context of social conventions, institutional expectations,
and normative values. To judge is to take a stand. And, therefore, it is always a
question of knowing where one stands and why one is standing there and not
someplace else. This task, both a blessing and a burden, cannot be fudged or
shirked; it can only be hidden.

V. CONCLUSION
For most lawyers and judges, the connection between day-to-day lawyering and
general jurisprudential debate is remote at best. The legal community manages
to get through their daily professional lives without fretting too much about
apparently abstract questions about the nature of law, fidelity to law, and
adjudicative integrity; they proceed in that artisanal way that characterises their
common law craft. Indeed, many would be disappointed if they looked to the
writings of jurists for specific answers to specific cases. To do so would be like
asking a saw to cut a piece of wood; it takes human skill and application to do
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so and the performance will vary depending on the saw user. However, the chill
between lawyers and jurists is not all the fault of lawyers. For their part, many
jurists tend to affect a certain detachment which encourages them not to get
their hands dirty with the prosaic matters of lawyering and judging. This state
of mutual suspicion and coolness does neither branch of the legal community
proud. The worlds of law and jurisprudence are intimately connected-the only
question is whether each wishes to recognise that and benefit from each other's
insights and experience or whether each continues to pretend otherwise to the
disadvantage of all concerned.

